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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to assess the explanatory power, and explore the compatibility of 
three major accounts of policy continuity and change in cross-border policy 
domains: Negotiation Analysis (NA), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), 
and the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework (PE). These frameworks are used to 
analyze policies for the river Scheldt estuary between 1967 and 2005. The estuary 
of the river Scheldt is partly situated in the Belgian region of Flanders and partly in 
the Netherlands. Major international policy issues in this estuary are the maritime 
access to the port of Antwerp, water and sediment pollution and estuarine 
rehabilitation. It will be shown that the negotiations on these issues are 
characterized by complex issue linkages, and that NA does very well in explaining 
both deadlocks and international policy agreement. However, unlike the ACF, NA 
does not specify how actors come to define their interests. Moreover, we will argue 
that learning across the pro-development Antwerp-coalition and the cross-border 
environmentalist coalition, accounts for a gradual convergence of Dutch and 
Flemish perceived interests. Finally, PE offers useful complementary insights as 
Scheldt estuary policies cannot be understood without addressing the interrelations 
2between the processes of negotiation, learning, the creation and enforcement of 
game rules, which have been going on in different venues simultaneously.
INTRODUCTION
Many policy issues, such as environmental degradation, transport or safety issues, 
are characterised by cross-border interdependencies, and therefore can be solved by 
joint international effort only. Reaching international policy agreement, however, is 
often a troublesome undertaking. Three theoretical frameworks that contribute to 
our understanding of international policy processes are Negotiation Analysis 
(Raiffa, 1982; Raiffa et al., 2002; Sebenius, 1992a and b), the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993; Sabatier, 1993 and 1998; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1999), and the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993 and 2002; True et al., 1999). Whilst Negotiation 
Analysis (NA) was developed for analyzing negotiations in multi-actor settings in 
general, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Punctuated-Equilibrium 
framework (PE) were developed for explaining domestic policy making primarily. 
These latter frameworks, however, have become increasingly popular amongst 
scholars interested in international policy processes (Blatter, 2001; Richardson, 
1996; Sabatier, 1998). NA addresses the processes of claiming and creating value, 
which can be distinguished in most negotiations, and the conditions conducive to 
multi-actor agreement or cooperation. With a focus on belief-coalitions, the ACF 
sheds light on the importance of ideas and policy-oriented learning for 
understanding policy continuity and change. Finally, PE draws our attention to the 
multiple venues within a policy domain, and the impact which venue change and 
strategies of venues shopping may have on the course of a policy process.
The central aims of this paper are to assess the explanatory power, and to 
explore the compatibility of the NA-, ACF-, and PE-accounts of (international) 
policy continuity and change by applying these frameworks to a case study of 
3policy making on Scheldt estuary issues. This case study is particularly apt as the 
negotiations over these issues were characterized by lengthy deadlocks, but 
nevertheless were concluded with several international agreements. Therefore, this 
case study enables us to account for both policy cooperation and discord. 
Moreover, the case provides a perfect illustration of the dynamics of policy 
oriented learning across advocacy coalitions, and of the interplay between different  
venues at multiple levels of government.  
The estuary of the river Scheldt is an international water system, which is 
shared between the Netherlands and the Belgian region of Flanders. The first main 
international issue in the Scheldt estuary policy domain is the maritime access to 
the port of Antwerp. Because the navigation channel in the Scheldt estuary, and the 
planned alignments of new waterways to Antwerp, are situated on Dutch territory, 
the Belgian authorities are fully dependent on the Dutch willingness to cooperate 
on the maintenance or improvement of the maritime access to Antwerp. The 
second issue is water and sediment pollution, which is caused by the high 
population density and industrialization in the Scheldt river basin, along with a lack 
of sewerage and waste water treatment. For that issue, the Netherlands, as a 
downstream basin state, is largely dependent on water quality policies of all
upstream basin states and regions: France and the Belgian regions of Flanders, 
Wallonia and the Brussels Capital. Finally, estuarine rehabilitation and nature 
restoration have reached the international agendas in the past years. The case study 
covers policy making on these issues in the period between 1967 and 2005. In 
1967, the Belgian government demanded that the Dutch cooperate on the 
realization of two new channels aimed at improving the maritime access to the port 
of Antwerp: the Bath and Baalhoek channels. After lengthy deadlocks, and several 
negotiation rounds in which new parties entered the negotiation arenas, and various 
issues were added and subtracted, the Flemish region and the Netherlands were 
able to reach an agreement on a deepening of the existing navigation channel in the 
4Western Scheldt in 1993. This agreement, which also contained provisions for 
compensating for the expected nature losses, was part of  a package deal including 
agreements on the improvement of the water quality of the rivers Scheldt and 
Meuse, the water distribution in the river Meuse, and an agreement on procedures 
for decision making on the alignment of a high speed train between Antwerp and 
Rotterdam. Flanders and the Netherlands have reached an agreement on a further 
deepening of the navigation channel, which again was part of a package deal, in 
2005.
For the case study, we have analyzed the files of the various international 
negotiation commissions, reports of Parliament, and the transcription of 40 
interviews with stakeholders of all Scheldt basin states and regions. In the 
following, we will first treat the basic concepts and hypotheses of NA, ACF and 
PE. Thereafter, these theories of international policy continuity and change will be 
compared, and the compatibility of the frameworks will be explored. In the second 
part of the paper, we employ the case study of policy making on international 
issues in the Scheldt estuary to assess the explanatory power of these frameworks. 
We conclude this paper with a discussion of the compatibility of the frameworks, 
and the theoretical implications of the case analysis.
THREE ACCOUNTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE
Negotiation Analysis
Within the NA-framework, the dependent variable is negotiated agreement or 
discord. Crucial assumptions of the NA-framework are that actors have fixed 
interests or preferences, and have a bounded rationality, which means that they will 
demonstrate intelligent goal-seeking rather than full rational behaviour as is 
assumed in formal game theory (Sebenius, 1992b). Moreover, according to 
5negotiation analysts, in most negotiations the potential value of joint action is not 
fully obvious at the outset (Ibid). The basic elements in a typical negotiation 
analysis are (Ibid.) (1) the actual and potential parties involved in negotiations and 
their perceived interests, (2) alternatives to negotiated agreement, (3) the linked 
processes of ‘creating’ and ‘claiming’ value, and (4) efforts to ‘change the game’  
itself.
In an international context, the basic unit of analysis is the nation state. 
Because of the absence of hierarchy (Martin, 1995), sometimes indicated 
international anarchy (Sebenius, 1992a), in an international context the basic game 
rule is unanimity. This means that all states have veto power, and that they will 
only be able to reach an agreement if this agreement makes them all better off as 
compared to their best alternative to negotiated agreement. Possible alternatives to 
a negotiated agreement can be going to an (international) court or an agreement 
amongst a smaller number of parties to exclude policy opponents. Among other 
things, NA focuses on possibilities to change distributive negotiations, which are 
also called zero sum (win-lose) games, into integrative negotiations, i.e. positive 
sum games in which all participants may gain. This process is sometimes referred 
to as ‘enlarging the pie’ or ‘creating value’. Sebenius (1992b) distinguishes 
between three factors which are the raw material from which negotiators can create 
value: (1) shared interests or policy preferences, (2) economies of scale or the 
production of collective goods, and (3) differences amongst negotiators. As 
Sebenius (1992b, p.29) argues ‘though many people instinctively seek ‘common 
ground’, and believe that ‘differences divide us’, it is often precisely the 
differences among negotiators that constitute the raw material for creating value’. 
One possibility to exploit differences, and to create value, is to employ the strategy 
of issue linkage (Davis, 2004; Fischhendler et al., 2004; Haas, 1980; Martin, 1995). 
According to Martin (1995), in cases where decision making is based on unanimity 
(as mostly is the case in an international context), and parties have different 
6preference-intensities in different issue-areas, the probability that movement away 
from the status quo will involve issue linkage is high (see Figure 1). According to 
her, in these situations issue linkage becomes one of the key elements in 
understanding international policy cooperation. By combining issues, a situation 
may be created in which all parties gain from an agreement. A particular 
combination of issues, however, which does not create a positive sum game, may 
undermine the effectiveness of a linkage strategy (Davis, 2004).
Decision-making rule
Majoritarian Unanimity
Preference 
intensities
Homogeneous very low low
Heterogeneous Low high
Figure 1: Probability that movement away from status quo will involve 
issue linkage (Martin, 1995, p.87)
A final element addressed in negotiation analysis is the efforts of actors to change 
the (perceived) structure, and hence the outcome of negotiations. One of the 
possibilities to change the structure of the game is to add or subtract issues and 
parties (Sebenius, 1992b).
Advocacy Coalition Framework
The basic argument of the ACF is that parties within a policy domain can be 
aggregated in one to four advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1993; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Parties within a coalition typically are civil servants, interest 
group representatives, applied scientists, politicians and journalist, and according to 
7the ACF, these parties share policy core beliefs. Actors’ belief systems are 
conceptualized as a layered structure. At the deepest level are the deep core beliefs. 
Deep core beliefs, among other things, concern the relative valuation of individual 
freedom versus social equity, and the perceived relationship between humans and 
nature. Policy core beliefs concern the basic normative commitments and causal 
perceptions across an entire policy domain, such as perceptions of the seriousness 
of a problem, cause-effect relationships, and opinions on whose welfare counts 
most. Sabatier (1998, p.113) has defined 11 critical topics defining the policy core 
of an advocacy coalition/ policy program. The secondary beliefs are about the less 
than subsystem-wide problem perceptions and solutions. Based on this layered 
conceptualisation of a belief system, the ACF makes a clear distinction between 
incremental and radical policy change, where incremental policy change is defined 
as a change of the secondary aspects, and radical policy change is a change of the 
policy core-aspects of a policy program. According to the ACF, radical policy 
change is explained by perturbations external to the policy subsystem or ‘external 
system event’. These can be changes in socio-economic conditions, changes in 
systemic governing coalition or policy decisions and impacts from other 
subsystems (Sabatier, 1993). It is recognized, however, that such changes do not 
have a direct impact, but have to be exploited by policy entrepreneurs first 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). 
Learning processes within and across advocacy coalitions may account for 
incremental policy change. Learning within coalitions is aimed at improving 
arguments to convince decision makers and members of opposing coalitions. 
Across-coalition learning means that coalitions incorporate in their belief system 
secondary aspects of belief systems of opposing coalitions. An intermediate level 
of conflict, the presence of professional forums prestigious enough for members of 
opposing coalitions to participate in, and an informed policy conflict are 
8hypothesized to be conducive to such learning processes (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier, 1993).
Punctuated-Equilibrium framework
A third account of (international) policy continuity and change, which we will 
discuss here, is the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework (PE). According to PE, 
most policy subsystems normally are characterised by stability or incremental 
change (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002; True et al., 1999), and policy monopolies 
are built on a policy image or powerful idea. Policy monopolies, however, do not 
last forever. Radical policy change, i.e. a movement toward a new equilibrium, is 
explained by the interaction between policy image and venues. It is argued that 
whilst the underlying structure of most policy issues is multi-dimensional, a policy 
image mostly is based on only one of these dimensions (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2002). As an example, the construction of a new motorway may be perceived as a 
solution to traffic congestion or as an ecological issue. It is argued that the 
underlying structure of an issue contains the seed for policy change. Policy 
opponents may actively try to shape a new policy image by focusing on one or 
more new dimensions of the issues at stake. Subsequently, they may try to attract 
supporters to the newly shaped policy image. According to the PE-framework, the 
multiple venues which are characteristic for most modern policy domains, offer 
opportunities for venues shopping. Policy opponents may actively search for 
venues more receptive to their policy image than venues where the ‘old’ image is 
prevalent (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002; Pralle, 2003; Richardson, 2000). In the 
PE-framework, it is exactly the combination of the underlying structure of a policy 
issue, and the multiple venues present within a policy domain which offer 
opportunities for policy change. When a new policy image attracts supporters, and 
becomes institutionalized, this marks the beginning of another period of stability.
9Comparing the frameworks
NA, ACF, and PE all produce relevant insights for understanding international 
policy stability and change. These frameworks, however, have different units of 
analysis. When negotiation analysis is applied to a case study of international 
negotiations, the basic unit of analysis is the specific negotiation setting in which 
representatives of the basin states, which each have specific interests, are 
negotiating. These negotiations are often conceived of as a two-level game in 
which negotiations in the international arenas are linked to domestic decision 
making on the positions to be taken in these negotiations (Putnam, 1988). In the 
ACF, the basic unit of analysis is the policy subsystem, which consist of the actors 
from all public and private organizations who are actively concerned with a policy 
problem or issue (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Finally, in the PE-framework 
the most important units of analysis are the institutional arrangements within a 
policy domain, in particular the multiples venues at the various levels of 
government.
Besides the different units of analysis, the frameworks have a different 
analytical focus as well. Whilst NA points to the relevance of processes of claiming 
and creating value, ACF draws our attention to the importance of beliefs and belief 
change for understanding  policy continuity and change, and with that adds the 
ideational dimension of policies. PE focuses on the process of shaping a new policy 
image, and the strategic exploitation of the multiple venues within a policy domain. 
Exactly because of the different loci and foci of the NA-, ACF- and PE-
frameworks, it is possible that these frameworks produce complementary insights 
rather than rival hypotheses about international policy continuity and change, and it 
is worth to explore their compatibility.
Perceived interest is a crucial variable in Negotiation Analysis. The NA-
framework, however, does not account for how various actors come to define their 
interests, and of how actors’ perceptions may change over time due to learning 
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processes. A similar argument was made by Sebenius (1992a), who explored the 
compatibility of Negotiation Analysis with Haas’ concept of epistemic 
communities (Haas, 1992 and 2001). According to Sebenius (1992a), the 
negotiation-analytic interpretation of the concept of epistemic community is that 
cross-border epistemic communities, which share a specific knowledge base and 
professional values, foster convergence among perceptions of interests and 
alternatives, and by that the chances for reaching agreement. Epistemic 
communities, however, often are closely connected to, can even considered to be 
part of advocacy coalitions (Dudley and Richardson, 1996; Meijerink, 2005). 
Therefore, we may expect cross-border advocacy coalitions, which share policy 
beliefs, to foster a convergence of perceived interests as well. However, as there 
are often more than one advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem, cross-
border coalitions do not account for a convergence of (perceived) interest per se. 
Because other coalitions will try to influence the perceptions of negotiators as well, 
mostly in quite the opposite direction, learning across the advocacy coalitions 
within a cross-border policy subsystem is hypothesized to be a better explanation 
of converging perceptions, than the existence of a single cross-border epistemic 
community or advocacy coalition.
By addressing the dynamics of policy-oriented learning, the ACF may 
account for changes in the perceived interest of the negotiating states over time, 
which is particularly relevant to an understanding of policy development over a 
longer time span. On the other hand, we may argue that ACF may benefit from 
negotiation analysis, since policy change cannot always be attributed to belief 
change (learning) or to external system events. In some cases, negotiated 
agreements represent a substantial change from the status quo (Sabatier et al., 
Forthcoming). It can be learned from NA that these negotiated agreements may be 
based on shared interests, but on a successful exploitation of differences as well.
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In another paper, we have argued the compatibility of parts of the ACF and 
PE-frameworks, as we may expect advocacy coalitions to foster their policy 
enterprise by shaping new policy images (Meijerink, 2005). Moreover, we expect 
that advocacy coalitions search actively for venues where chances for getting 
support for their policy proposals are the highest. The concept of venue shopping is 
relevant to NA is well. Indeed going to court (which is an alternative venue) may 
be an alternative to negotiated agreement. Other venues may offer opportunities to 
alter the structure of the game (the rules of the game), for example by including 
new actors in the negotiations or by adding or subtracting issues. Still other venues 
may be used to start a process of joint fact finding and learning on a policy issue, in 
order to purposefully alter the perceived interests, and hence the perceived zone of 
possible agreements of policy opponents. By analysing the advocacy coalitions 
within cross-border policy subsystems, and addressing the strategies of venue 
shopping employed by these (cross-border) coalitions, the conceptualisation of 
international negotiations as a two level game is challenged.
EXPLAINING SCHELDT ESTUARY POLICIES 1967-2005
In this Section, we will introduce the main issues in the Scheldt estuary which have 
reached the top of the international negotiation agenda in the past decades. 
Thereafter, the theoretical frameworks of NA, ACF, and PE will be used to analyze 
Scheldt estuary policy making 1967-2005.
International issues in the Scheldt estuary 1967-2005
The Scheldt is a relatively small international river, which rises in France, flows 
through Belgium and the Netherlands, and debouches into the North Sea. Since the 
Belgian part of the Scheldt basin extends over the Walloon, Flemish and Brussels 
Capital regions, there actually are six states and/or regions involved in the 
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management of this river (Meijerink, 1999). The Scheldt estuary, which is the part 
of the river basin under tidal influence, is shared between the Flemish region and 
the Netherlands.
The first important issue concerns the maritime access to the port of 
Antwerp. The port of Antwerp is one of the biggest ports in the world, hence of 
crucial importance to the Flemish and Belgian economy. Since the maritime access 
to the port of Antwerp is largely situated on Dutch territory, Belgium is dependent 
on the cooperation of the Dutch for the improvement and/or maintenance of the 
navigation channel in the Western Scheldt, and the digging of new waterways on 
Dutch territory. In the past decades, the main issues have been (Ibid.): (1) the 
construction of the Baalhoek canal which would give the port of Antwerp a second 
navigation channel to the North Sea, (2) the construction of the Bath canal, a by-
pass in the Western Scheldt, which would shorten the navigation distance to the 
port of Antwerp, (3) the maintenance of the navigation channel in the Western 
Scheldt, and (4) several deepening programs aimed at improving conditions for 
navigation on the existing navigation channel in the Western Scheldt.
Other important estuarine issues are water and sediment pollution. Because 
of the high population density and industrialization in the Scheldt basin, and a lack 
of sewerage and waste water treatment infrastructure, the Scheldt estuary has been 
heavily polluted in the past decades. Since the pollutants adhere to the find 
sediments, the estuary suffers from sediment contamination. The third issue is 
estuarine rehabilitation, which has reached the international agenda in the eighties 
and nineties of the twentieth century. It was recognized that human activities, such 
as land reclamation along the estuary, and the dredging works for maintenance and 
deepening have had a negative impact on the geo-morphological processes in the 
estuary. 
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Negotiations and issue linkages
In the following, the negotiations on the Scheldt and Meuse water conventions will 
be analyzed. We have made a distinction between five time periods, which are 
marked by six crucial events: the Belgian proposal to negotiate various 
infrastructure issues with the Netherlands in 1967, the Walloon rejection of the 
draft Belgian-Dutch water conventions in 1975, the Belgian-Dutch agreement to 
restart negotiations of 1985, the Dutch decision to unlink the bilateral and 
multilateral Scheldt and Meuse issues in 1992, the  conclusion of the water 
conventions in 1995, and, finally, the Flemish-Dutch agreement on a further 
deepening of the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt of 2005.
Cross-basin issue linkages and the Belgian-Dutch water conventions (1967-1975)
Economic prosperity, and the completion of several infrastructure projects which 
had improved the competitiveness of the port of Antwerp, such as the Rhine-
Scheldt-connection and the Zandvliet sluice, induced a rapid expansion of the port 
in the sixties of the past century (Bouchez, 1978; Suykens, 1995). Because hardly 
any space was left on the right bank, ambitious plans were developed for the 
construction of new harbours on the left bank of the river Scheldt (Suykens, 1995). 
These plans comprised the construction of a second waterway to the (harbours on 
the left bank) of the port of Antwerp. This is the Baalhoek canal, which would be 
situated largely on Dutch territory. In addition, the Belgian government developed 
plans for straightening a sharp bend in the Western Scheldt by the construction of 
the Bath canal, which would shorten the navigation distance from the North sea to 
Antwerp with three kilometres (Strubbe, 1988). The Belgian government proposed 
to start negotiations on the construction of the Baalhoek and Bath-canals in 1967. 
The Dutch government, however, had no interest in fostering Flemish prosperity, 
on the contrary, had more interest in maintaining the relative competitive 
advantage of the port of Rotterdam, which is situated nearby the North Sea. 
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Therefore, the Dutch decided to link the Baalhoek and Bath issues to three issues 
that were of importance to the Netherlands: the water quantity (river discharge) and 
water quality of the river Meuse, and the water quality of the river Scheldt 
(Strubbe, 1988). The river Meuse, like the river Scheldt, rises in France, and flows 
through Belgium and the Netherlands to the North Sea. Relatively small parts of 
the Meuse basin are situated in Luxembourg and Germany. Whereas the largest 
part of the Scheldt basin is situated in Flanders, the largest part of the Meuse basin 
is situated in Wallonia. The Meuse issues were of importance to the Netherlands, 
mainly as Meuse water is a crucial source for drinking water production in the 
southern Randstad, the urbanized western part of the Netherlands.
From a negotiation-analytical perspective, the Dutch linkage is at first sight 
a rational strategy. It was aimed at creating a positive sum game in which all 
parties could gain from a negotiated agreement. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the delegations of Belgium and the Netherlands were able to reach agreement on a 
package deal in 1975. This deal comprised three Belgian-Dutch conventions 
dealing with all five issues introduced above, the ‘Belgian-Dutch water 
conventions’ (TK 1977-1978, 854).
A total deadlock (1975-1985)
After the delegations had reached an agreement, and draft conventions had been 
sent to Belgian and Dutch parliaments, politicians of the Walloon region started to 
oppose the proposed package deal. According to them, the Walloon region would 
not benefit from any of the conventions proposed, whilst the region would be 
obliged to make huge investments for ameliorating the water quality of the river 
Meuse. Moreover, the region would have to cooperate on the construction of 
storage reservoirs in the Meuse valley, in order to be able to guarantee a minimum 
river discharge to the Dutch in dry periods. In sum, the Walloon politicians were of 
the opinion they would have to pay in order to benefit the Flemish region, which 
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would gain from the improved access to the port of Antwerp. According to 
Planchar (1993, p. 92) “the two Antwerp projects, the Bath and Baalhoek 
conventions, formed in fact a real trilogy because the closing element- a third 
convention on the water of the river Meuse- was presented to the Walloon region 
as a ‘fait accompli’, real exchange for the benefit of the Netherlands and Antwerp”. 
Because the Belgian regions were not able to reach an agreement on the Scheldt 
and Meuse issues, the draft conventions of 1975 have never been signed. Clearly, 
decision making on a joint Belgian position in these negotiations was hindered by 
the Belgian federalization process in which an increasing number of competencies 
were transferred to the regions. 
In spite of the difficulties of reaching a Belgian-Dutch agreement on the 
water conventions, the Belgian government launched a new international issue in 
1977. In that year it proposed to start discussions on a deepening of the navigation 
channel in the Western Scheldt. The dredging of several bars in the Western 
Scheldt would allow for larger ships to navigate to the port of Antwerp, and would 
make possibilities for navigation less dependent on tides. For the same reasons as 
mentioned above, the Dutch linked the deepening of the navigation channel to the 
issues of the water quality and water quantity of the river Meuse.
Laborious negotiations, and a break-through (1985-1992)
In 1985, Belgian and Dutch Ministers signed a declaration of intent, in which they 
declared that they would start negotiations on the water quality and quantity of the 
Meuse, the construction of the Baalhoek canal and the deepening of the Western 
Scheldt simultaneously (TK 1985-1986, 19200, No. 12). Because a deepening of 
the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt was an alternative to the 
construction of a new canal, the issue of the Bath canal was removed from the 
international agenda. Walloon politicians, however, made known their objections 
to the Belgian-Dutch agreement again. They strongly opposed the sections in the 
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declaration which dealt with the construction of storage reservoirs in the Belgian 
Ardennes. Only after these parts of the declaration had been scrapped, would 
negotiations over the Scheldt and Meuse issues start again. However, because of 
the ongoing Belgian internal disagreement, and the Dutch issue linkages, parties 
would not be able to reach an agreement until 1993. In spite of the lengthy 
deadlock, the Dutch maintained the linkages they had made, as they speculated on 
an internal Belgian agreement, i.e. a Flemish compensation of Walloon ‘losses’ 
(TK 1994-1995, 24 041 No.3). At the beginning of 1992, some discussions were 
going on about the modernization of the Albert canal, which is the connection 
between the Walloon port of Liège and the port of Antwerp, and a new canal 
between Oelegem and Zandvliet, which would connect the Albert canal to the 
Scheldt-Rhine connection (Planchar, 1993; COIB, 1994). Both projects would be 
beneficial to the Walloon city of Liège. Because these projects would cause huge 
spatial problems in Flanders, however, the Flemish region was unwilling to accept 
such linkages. Possibilities for a Dutch compensation of Walloon losses were 
discussed as well. This concerned several infrastructure projects aimed at 
improving the navigation channel from Rotterdam to Liège. Dutch efforts to 
compensate the Walloon region, however, failed as well.  
At about the same time, three crucial events took place, which would 
restructure the negotiation game entirely (Meijerink, 1999). First, the Scheldt basin 
states, along with other members of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, signed the UN-ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Water courses and International Lakes (UN-ECE, 1992). According 
to this convention, the river basin is the appropriate scale for dealing with water 
issues, such as pollution and environmental degradation. Whereas in the past 
negotiations had been confined to Belgium and the Netherlands, it would from then 
on be necessary to involve the upstream basin state France in the negotiations on 
the water quality of the Scheldt and the Meuse. Secondly, the third stage of the 
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Belgian state reforms was completed in 1992. Because of these reforms, the 
Belgian regions received many treaty-making competencies, among others in the 
field of water management. Consequently, the Netherlands (and France) would be 
able to negotiate directly with the Belgian regions. Because of these two important 
developments, and as the efforts to compensate the Walloon region had failed, the 
Dutch government decided to unlink the bilateral Flemish-Dutch and multilateral 
Scheldt and Meuse issues in 1992. Issue linkages, however, would still play a 
crucial role in the conclusion of the Scheldt and Meuse conventions.
New linkages and the conclusion of the water conventions (1992-1995)
The Dutch decision to unlink the bilateral and multilateral Scheldt and Meuse 
issues was a relief to the Belgian negotiators, and two new negotiation 
commissions were installed in 1992. A multilateral negotiation commission with 
representatives of all Scheldt and Meuse basin states and regions started 
deliberations and negotiations on multilateral water quality conventions for the 
Scheldt and Meuse. At the same time, in a bilateral Flemish-Dutch negotiation 
commission, the deepening of the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt and 
the distribution of Meuse water were discussed together. Because discussions with 
the Walloon region about the Meuse water discharge had proven to be laborious, 
the Dutch and Flemish governments decided to discuss that issue bilaterally. 
Flanders diverts Meuse water via the Albert canal to the city of Antwerp. Hence, 
the region has possibilities to influence the Meuse water discharge to the 
Netherlands, and is able to negotiate this issue with the Dutch without involving 
the Walloon region. In both the multilateral and the bilateral negotiation 
commissions, negotiations went rather smoothly, and the delegations were able to 
reach agreement on draft conventions by the end of 1993. In May 1993, however, 
the Flemish government had proposed linking the negotiations on the deepening 
program to the negotiations on the alignment of a high speed train (Hoge 
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Snelheidslijn, HSL) from Rotterdam to Antwerp, an issue in which the Dutch had a 
main interest. Clearly, the purpose of the Flemish government was to speed up 
decision making on the deepening program. This linkage, however, turned out to 
be a serious mistake, as the Dutch and Flemish delegations could reach an 
agreement on the deepening issue easily, whilst decision making on the alignment 
of the high speed train turned out to be highly complicated. Hence, the Dutch used 
the linkage, which had been made by the Flemish region, to put pressure on the 
Flemish government. In reaction, the Flemish government decided to restore the 
linkage between multilateral and bilateral Scheldt and Meuse issues it had always 
opposed. ‘Desperate needs lead to desperate deeds’ (Meijerink 1999, p. 206); the 
Flemish region refused to sign any of the other Scheldt and Meuse conventions as 
long as the Dutch would not agree on the implementation of the deepening 
program. It was only in December 1994 that Flanders and the Netherlands reached 
an agreement on the approval of all bilateral and multilateral Scheldt and Meuse 
conventions, and a planning scheme for joint decision making on the alignment of 
the HSL. In 1995, all conventions were actually signed, and after a period of 
almost thirty years, the Belgian-Dutch water conventions were concluded (Trb. 
1994 Nr. 149 and 150; Trb.1995, Nr. 50 and 51).
Negotiations on a further deepening of the navigation channel in the Western 
Scheldt (1995-2005)
From 1995, Flanders and the Netherlands worked on a joint implementation of 
these conventions. Because of the increasing draught of modern ships, however, 
Flanders initiated at that time a debate on a further deepening of the navigation 
channel in the Western Scheldt. In spite of a carefully designed joint planning 
process, Flanders and the Netherlands ended up with issue linkages again. As new 
conflicts about the HSL had arisen, this time about the frequency of the trains, and 
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travel times, the Dutch linked the deepening of the navigation channel to HSL-
issue, and an agreement on both issues was reached only in 2005.
Because of the European Water Framework Directive, which was adopted 
in 2000 (European directive nr. 2000/60/EG), the Scheldt basin states and regions 
started new discussions about Scheldt water policies as well. They were able to 
reach an agreement on a new Scheldt convention that would, in 2002, replace the 
convention of 1995. The main differences between these conventions are that water 
quantity issues (both flood control and management of low flows) are included in 
the convention now, and that the convention is not confined to the main stream of 
the river Scheldt. In line with the concept of river basin management, it contains 
provisions for the preparation of plans for the entire Scheldt river basin, i.e. 
including the tributaries (TK 2004-2005, 29 886, Nr.1). 
Learning within and across advocacy coalitions
In the previous Section, we have analysed international policy making as a 
negotiation process between states (and in case of the federal state of Belgium: 
regions). In this Section, we focus on a different unit of analysis, and take a more 
detailed look at the Scheldt estuary policy subsystem, and the advocacy coalitions 
which may be discerned within that subsystem. After introducing the pro-
development Antwerp coalition, the environmentalist coalition, and the farmers’ 
coalition, we will discuss the learning processes, which have taken place within 
and across these coalitions, and the conditions that have been conducive to across-
coalition learning.
Three advocacy coalitions
Within the Scheldt estuary subsystem, three main advocacy coalitions have 
dominated the policy process in the past decades. The first advocacy coalition, 
which we will call hereafter the ‘Antwerp-coalition’, is a pro-development 
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coalition aimed at improving the maritime access to the port of Antwerp. Important 
members of this coalition are officials of the Antwerp Port Association (Antwerpse 
Gemeenschap voor de Haven), the Antwerp port authorities, aldermen of the city of 
Antwerp, representatives of the Flemish Ministry of Infrastructure and Sea Affairs, 
most Flemish politicians, and several journalists of Flemish newspapers. The 
following topics are characteristic of the pro-development coalition. First, this 
coalition attaches more importance to the maritime access to the Port of Antwerp 
and economic growth of the Flemish region than to the ecological values of the 
Scheldt estuary. Secondly, according to the Antwerp coalition, the unwillingness of 
the Dutch to cooperate on the improvement of the navigation channel in the 
Western Scheldt unconditionally, is the main cause of the access problems which 
the port of Antwerp is facing. In the seventies and the beginning of the eighties of 
the past century, the main policy enterprise of the Antwerp coalition was the 
realization of the Baalhoek and Bath canals. Since 1984, the main policy enterprise 
of this coalition has been to improve the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt 
by the dredging of several bars in the Western Scheldt.
The second advocacy coalition is the environmentalist coalition and, unlike 
the pro-development coalition, it is a cross-border coalition, which was formed in 
the seventies of the past century. This coalition consists of representatives of a 
large number of environmental NGOs, such as the Zeeland environment foundation 
(Zeeuwse Milieu Federatie), the Zeeland landscape foundation (Stichting het 
Zeeuwse landschap), the Dutch Reinwater foundation (Stichting Reinwater), the 
Belgian association for a better environment (Bont Beter Leefmilieu), Greenpeace, 
and various international groups, such as the International Scheldt working group 
(Internationale Schelde werkgroep), the action group ‘Save the Scheldt’ (‘Redt de 
Schelde’, and the international working group Scheldt without frontiers (Schelde 
zonder grenzen). Other coalition members are researchers of various research 
institutes, such as the Dutch Centre for Estuarine and Marine Ecology (NIOZ-
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CEMO), the Dutch governmental research institute for Coastal and Marine 
Management (Rijksinstituut voor Kust en Zee, RIKZ),  and the Flemish Institute 
for Nature conservation (Instituut voor Natuurbehoud), journalists of regional 
newspapers in the province of Zeeland, and representatives of various Dutch 
government agencies, such as the regional Directorate Zeeland of the Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management, and representatives of 
Municipalities along the Western Scheldt, which were united in the Taskforce for 
the Western Scheldt (Taakgroep Westerschelde) of the Dutch Association of River 
Municipalities. Finally, a majority of Dutch Parliament, and few members of 
Flemish Parliament are part of this environmentalist coalition. The policy core of 
this coalition was that the Scheldt estuary is a unique ecosystem, which needs to be 
preserved. According to this coalition, the maritime access to the port of Antwerp 
is an important issue, but the ecological values of the Scheldt estuary (the only 
remaining more or less natural estuary of the rivers Rhine, Scheldt and Meuse) are 
even more important. Land-reclamation in the past, water and sediment pollution, 
and the morphological disturbances which are caused by the dredging works in the 
Western Scheldt navigation channel, all would pose serious threats to the 
ecosystem of the Scheldt estuary. This coalition tried to reshape the image of the 
Scheldt estuary from being a navigation channel into the image of a unique 
ecosystem, which needs to be preserved, and should be managed collectively (the 
estuary as a common pool resource). Moreover, they tried to shape a policy image 
of the Scheldt estuary as a highly polluted water system that needs to be cleaned-
up. According to this coalition, the main causes for Scheldt water pollution are the 
poorly developed environmental policies in Belgium. 
The third influential coalition distinguished here, developed only after the 
conclusion of the water conventions in 1995. The convention on the deepening of 
the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt entailed the development and 
implementation of plans for nature restoration in order to compensate for the 
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ecological damages, which would be caused by the deepening dredging works. 
Experts on river ecology were of the opinion that the only possible option for 
compensating for nature losses is to give back to the sea land which has been taken 
from the Scheldt estuary in the past centuries. By giving land back, which is called 
‘ontpolderen’, the tidal volume and tidal dynamics of the estuary would be partly 
restored. In spite of a broad consensus amongst experts about the need for 
‘ontpolderen’, strong opposition against these plans developed in the Dutch 
province of Zeeland (Ringeling, 1997). Individual farmers, who would be affected 
by these plans, along with farmers’ organisations, organized a successful campaign 
in which they exploited successfully the feelings of the Zeeland population. 
Historically, the people of Zeeland had always fought against the water, and 
particularly since the construction of the Delta Works, they have been rather 
successful in that. The farmers’ coalition managed to shape a policy image as if 
‘ontpolderen’ along the Western Scheldt would be to the detriment of the safety of 
the Zeeland population. As they were rather successful in that, many regional and 
local politicians decided in the end not to cooperate on the plans for ‘ontpolderen’, 
which had been proposed by the environmentalist coalition.
Policy-oriented learning
Within these coalitions, learning took place about the best means to reach policy 
objectives. The Antwerp coalition, for example, learned that the construction of the 
Baalhoek canal would be extremely expensive and entail many spatial planning 
complexities. Moreover, this coalition learned that a further deepening of the 
navigation channel in the Western Scheldt would make the construction of the new 
Bath channel unnecessary. Because of these learning processes, the perceived 
interests of the Belgian (and later the Flemish) governments, hence the 
international negotiation agenda, have changed.
23
The environmentalist coalition was connected to an epistemic community 
of ecologists and biologists. Key officials of the regional Directorate Zeeland and 
the Research institute for Coastal and Marine Management, and researchers of the 
Centre for Estuarine ecology and the Flemish Institute for Nature Conservation, 
were ecologists. This relatively small network of experts in estuarine ecology
initiated various research projects aimed at describing and explaining the 
functioning of the ecosystem in the Scheldt estuary, and fostered research on the 
potential ecological damages caused by the dredging works (Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works and Water Management, 1994a and b and 1997). In addition, 
numerous reports indicated the seriousness of Scheldt water and sediment pollution 
(cf. Bond Beter Leefmilieu, IPR, 1991; ISG, 1994; Stichting Reinwater, 1992). 
Because of these research projects, the environmentalist coalition has built up an 
impressive knowledge base on the negative impacts of human activities on the 
Scheldt ecosystem.  
Besides learning within the different coalitions, it is interesting to assess 
the degree of cross-coalition learning, and the relevance of the ACF-hypotheses 
about conditions conducive to such learning. In the seventies and eighties, the 
Antwerp coalition had no eye for the water quality and ecological issues in the 
Western Scheldt at all. As a consequence, the provisions in the draft conventions of 
1975 about an improvement of the Scheldt water quality, were perceived as being 
no more than an exchange in the negotiations with the Dutch. As the negotiations 
on the water conventions were characterized by lengthy conflicts, these 
negotiations did not shape optimal conditions for cross-coalition learning. The high 
level of conflict clearly hindered information exchange, and joint research projects. 
Even though there were various forums where international Scheldt issues were 
discussed, such as the Technical Scheldt Commission and its various 
subcommissions, a series of international Scheldt conferences, and the 
International Scheldt Group (ISG), cross-coalition learning hardly developed until 
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1992. As an example, the work of the ISG, which aimed at making an inventory of 
the seriousness of all water quality problems in the Scheldt basin, and of the main 
sources of water pollution, was hindered by the tense atmosphere in the 
negotiations on the water conventions. Experts were not always allowed to appear, 
and every single step taken in this informal working group had to be approved by 
top servants of the Ministries. Only after the Dutch had decided to unlink the 
bilateral and multilateral Scheldt and Meuse issues, did the relationship between 
the Scheldt basin states and regions gradually improve, and across coalition 
learning started to develop. From then, the ACF- conditions for cross-coalition 
learning were largely met. First, there were various professional forums were 
international Scheldt issues could be discussed. Secondly, as compared to the past, 
there was an intermediate level of conflict between members of opposing 
coalitions. Finally, although the ecological Scheldt issues remained largely 
intractable, the epistemic community of ecologists had built an important 
knowledge base to draw on. 
As a consequence, the Antwerp coalition gradually became more 
responsive to the claims made by the ecologists, and recognized the need to 
improve the Scheldt water quality, and to preserve the Scheldt ecosystem as well. 
First, since the nineties was  the Flemish Ministry of Infrastructure and Sea Affairs 
willing to cooperate on the extraction of large amounts of polluted sediments near 
the port of Antwerp, even though these sanitation dredging works would be 
beneficial mainly for the water quality in the Dutch Western Scheldt (Ministry of 
the Flemish region, Department for the Environment and Infrastructure, 1991 and 
1995). It should be noted that the obligation to extract polluted sediments was one 
of the main conditions formulated in a permit which the Dutch had granted to the 
Flemish region for the dumping of dredging material in the Western Scheldt. 
According to various respondents, however, the Flemish Ministry accepted these 
conditions rather easily, because it had an eye for the severe pollution problems as 
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well. Secondly, the Flemish Ministry participated actively in discussions about 
technical possibilities to minimize the negative impacts of the dredging works. 
These discussions were about the strategies for dumping dredged material, but also 
about the manner in which the dredging works for maintenance and deepening 
were carried out. The concept of ‘morphological dredging’ was introduced, which 
was aimed at minimizing the morphological disturbances caused by the dredging 
works. Finally, the Antwerp coalition was willing to discuss possibilities to 
compensate for damages to the environment, which would be caused by the 
implementation of the deepening programs (Niesing et al., 1996). Whilst the policy 
core of the Antwerp coalition has hardly changed, and the maritime access to the 
port of Antwerp is still perceived as the most important issue in the Scheldt 
estuary, secondary aspects, such as the manner in which dredging works were 
carried out, have proven to be more amenable to change. 
Due to the high conflict between the farmers’ and environmentalist 
coalitions, no learning across these coalitions has developed at all, and the ‘debate’ 
between those who are oppose ‘ontpolderen’ and the environmentalists still can be 
characterized best as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’. It is interesting to note that the main 
arguments for ‘ontpolderen’ have changed remarkably in the past years. 
Monitoring studies of the geomorphological and ecological disturbances, which 
would be caused by the deepening program, indicated that, mainly because of the 
new strategies and techniques for dredging and dumping sediments, hardly any 
negative impacts on the Scheldt ecosystem could be assessed. These observations 
underline that issues of estuarine ecology are still largely intractable. Experts, 
however, still argue that ‘ontpolderen’ is necessary. It increases the water storage 
capacity of the estuary, which would be necessary for flood control in the long run.
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Venue change
In the preceding Sections, we have focused on the negotiations between the Scheldt 
basin states and regions, and the learning processes within and across advocacy 
coalitions within the Scheldt estuary policy domain. Here, we will address the 
existence of multiple venues and strategies of venue shopping. This is helpful in 
linking the negotiations in the various international negotiations commissions, to 
the learning processes, which have developed in the various professional forums. 
Besides venues for negotiation and venues (forums) for learning, venues for the 
creation and for the enforcement of the rules of the game are relevant to an 
understanding of Scheldt estuary policies.
The main venues for negotiation were the negotiation commission for the 
water conventions (1969-1975), the negotiation commissions Biesheuvel-Davignon 
(1987-1989) and Biesheuvel-Poppe (1989-1991), and the bilateral and multilateral 
negotiation commissions where Scheldt and Meuse issues were discussed (1992-
1994). In these commissions, negotiation, i.e. the process of claiming and creating 
value, has been the dominant style of interaction. Venues for research and joint fact 
finding were the Technical Scheldt Commission (1948-2005), the various 
subcommissions and working groups of this commission, the international Scheldt 
conferences, and the International Scheldt Group (1991-1993). These venues 
(forums) offered opportunities for learning. Important venues for the creation of 
rules of the game for the management of international waters, were the United 
Nations-Economic Commission for Europe and the various venues at the European 
level. Both the UN-ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes and the European Water Framework 
Directive, have changed the rules of the game for international Scheldt policy 
making considerably. Moreover, the transfer of treaty-making competencies to the 
regions in the third stage of the Belgian state reforms, was a fundamental change of 
the rules of the game. Finally, our case study illustrates the importance of venues 
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for the enforcement of the rules of the game. For example, Dutch and Flemish 
environmental NGOs have successfully appealed to the court in order to enforce 
the legal obligation to issue an Environmental Impact Assessment for the 
implementation of dredging works. Hence, the Dutch national government had to 
issue special legislation before it was able to continue the implementation of the 
Convention on the deepening of the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt. 
Moreover, some members of the Antwerp coalition threatened more than once to 
appeal to the international court, as they were of the opinion that the Dutch have to 
cooperate on improving the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt 
unconditionally, according to international law.
The dynamics of Scheldt estuary policies cannot be understood without 
addressing the relationships between the processes of negotiation, learning, 
creation, and the enforcement of the rules of the game, which have been going on 
in different venues simultaneously. Because of cross-coalition learning in the 
working groups of the TSC, the Antwerp coalition incorporated some elements of 
the belief system of the environmentalist coalition in their belief system. This 
influenced the perceived interest and position of the Flemish government in the 
negotiations with the Dutch. The other way round, the high level of conflict and 
many deadlocks in the international negotiations clearly hindered the process of 
joint fact finding in, for example, the ISG. The conclusion of the UN-ECE 
convention and the ongoing Belgian federalization process changed the structure of 
the game fundamentally, because new parties (France and the Belgian regions) 
were added to the international negotiation commissions. Finally, the EU Water 
Framework Directive imposed a new set of rules of the game, such as a fixed time 
schedule for the preparation of river basin plans, and the achievement of water 
quality objectives.
If we focus on one type of venues, say the venues for learning, 
developments in the other venues, such as the venues for negotiations and for the 
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creation of rules of the game, may be treated as contextual developments. Since 
coalition members employ strategies of venue shopping (and venue creation and 
manipulation), however, such a sharp distinction between context and phenomenon 
studied is problematic. In our study of Scheldt estuary policy making, the drafting 
of the UN-ECE Convention and the EU Water Framework Directive, may at first 
sight be interpreted as contextual developments. A better look at the processes that 
have been going on in these venues, however, shows that some negotiators 
involved in the negotiations over the Scheldt and Meuse water conventions were 
involved in the negotiations on the UN-ECE convention as well, and that these 
negotiators exploited the venue of the UN-ECE to attract supporters to the image of 
international water management issues as being issues that have to be solved 
collectively by all basin states (Meijerink, 1999). Moreover, the same 
governmental bureaus which were involved in the negotiations on the Scheldt and 
Meuse water conventions, were involved in the preparatory work for the EU Water 
Framework Directive. In that process, representatives of the downstream basin 
state the Netherlands, along with other protagonists of the river basin approach, 
strongly put forward the concepts of integrated water management and river basin 
management (and with that tried to attract supporters for a new image of
international water issues). These two examples illustrate that the rules of the game 
are partly endogenous to the policy process. Foremost, however, they illustrate the 
relevance of strategies of venue shopping for understanding policy change. Venues 
may be exploited strategically to purposefully alter the rules of the game, to 
enforce these rules, to create value (for example by making issue linkages), or to 
proliferate ideas and stimulate learning. On the other hand, the impact which the 
attribution of treaty-making competencies to the Belgian regions has had on the 
negotiations over the Scheldt and Meuse water conventions, illustrates that 
independent external developments also may account for a major change of the 
rules of the game.
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CONCLUSION: COMPATIBILITY OF THE FRAMEWORKS
The central aims of this paper were to assess the analytical power of the NA, ACF 
and PE-frameworks, and to explore their compatibility. The Scheldt estuary policy 
domain is characterized by complex interdependencies between the basin states and 
regions. Basically, the Dutch are largely dependent on Belgium and France as 
regards the river discharge and water quality of the Scheldt and Meuse rivers. On 
the other hand, Belgium is dependent on the Netherlands as regards the 
maintenance and improvement of the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt 
and/ or the construction of new waterways aimed at improving the maritime access 
to the port of Antwerp. The different (perceived) interests of the Belgian regions of 
Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels, and the Belgian federal state structure, add to this 
complexity. Although the main parties perceived hardly any shared interests or 
preferences, and, at least in the first part of our case study period, did not perceive 
international Scheldt and Meuse issues as collective action (or commons) problems 
at all, there was, nevertheless, joint action. This should be explained by the many 
issue linkages across policy domains. Our case study is a perfect corroboration of 
Martin’s hypothesis that in situations of heterogeneous preference intensities across 
policy domains and in which the decision-making rule is unanimity (as has always 
been the case in the negotiations on the water conventions), chances for issue 
linkages are high. By exploiting differences amongst negotiators, win-lose games 
were transformed into positive sum games, and by that value was created. It can, 
however, also be learned from this case that the short-term implication of the issue 
linkages is a delay in the negotiations. As argued by Fischhendler et al. (2004, p. 
634) ‘[…] natural resources are often considered as a local resource protected by 
local practices or by laws, and hence owned and managed by local groups, states, 
and basin riparians. Transbasin and interstate linkages that redistribute the 
resources among users may increase the number of stakeholders and riparians who 
incur costs, and so may provide an incentive to oppose the agreement. In this case 
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linkages may actually cause delays in reaching a negotiated agreement’. This is 
exactly what happened in the Scheldt case. The linkages, which the Dutch had 
made between the Scheldt and Meuse issues, provided an incentive for the Walloon 
region to oppose the agreements proposed. In our case, Negotiation Analysis has 
proven to be a very useful analytical tool. Perceived interests of the Scheldt basin 
states and regions, their strategies of claiming and creating value, issue linkages 
particularly, and the structure of the game, are the key to understanding both the 
lengthy deadlocks and the breakthroughs in the negotiation process.
As we have used a long time perspective we have observed changes in 
perceived interests of the basin states and regions as well, and we needed to include 
the role of ideas in our account of Scheldt estuary policies. Whilst NA assumes 
relatively fixed preferences, the ACF focuses explicitly on belief systems and 
belief change (learning) for understanding policy change. Within the Scheldt 
estuary subsystem, we have been able to distinguish three main advocacy 
coalitions: the pro-development Antwerp coalition, the environmentalist coalition, 
and a farmers’ coalition. The environmentalist coalitions was a cross-border 
coalition which was strongly tied to an epistemic community of ecologists. This 
coalition tried to shape a policy image of the Scheldt estuary as a unique 
ecosystem, which needs to be preserved. Only after the Dutch decision to unlink 
the bilateral and multilateral Scheldt issues, after which the level of conflict was 
reduced, did learning across the pro-development and environmentalist coalition 
start to develop, and the Antwerp coalition incorporated some elements of the 
environmentalist coalitions in its belief system. This cross-coalition learning may 
account for the changed strategies and techniques for dredging and dumping 
sediments, the development of plans for compensating for nature losses caused by 
the dredging works, and partly for the development of water quality policies in the 
Flemish region. Summarizing, the ACF has been helpful in explaining why the 
Scheldt estuary was increasingly perceived as a shared water system, which not 
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only has an important economic function, but possesses unique ecological values as 
well.
Finally, we have argued that Scheldt estuary policy making cannot be 
understood without addressing the interactions between the multiple venues where 
international Scheldt issues were discussed. We have made a distinction between 
venues for negotiation, learning, for the design, and the enforcement of the rules of 
the game. Moreover, it has been shown that these venues have been exploited 
strategically so as to purposefully alter the rules of the game or to frustrate policy 
implementation. 
These frameworks produce useful complementary insights, and therefore 
contribute to our understanding of the complexity of international policy dynamics. 
Moreover, some elements of a single framework could be integrated in the other 
frameworks, i.e. the frameworks may benefit form each other. The ACF sheds light 
on how actors come to define their interests, and with that may contribute to a 
Negotiation Analysis. Furthermore, it has been shown that the concept of venue 
shopping is highly relevant to the analysis of coalition behaviour. Finally, the 
shaping of new policy images, as is addressed in PE-theory, could be related to the 
activities of coalitions which share policy beliefs.
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